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IV

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arrives on appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment in a nonjury civil action to plaintiff/respondent !vfarian B. Baker, Trustee of the Marian B. Baker Trust,
dated May 12, 2013, ("Baker"), in a suit to quiet title relating to an access easement located over
property owned by defendants KAL, LLC ("KAL"), John Stadler and Vicki Stadler, husband and
wife ("Stadler"), and Jose I. Melendreras and Jacqueline Z. Diaz-Melendreras ("Melendreras").
Baker filed suit to quiet title following efforts by KAL and Stadler to preclude Baker from using
a well-established roadway to access Baker's property. The image embedded below depicts the
subject roadway and the various properties involved in this lawsuit:

Baker owns what is depicted as Tract 8 (the ·'Baker Property"); K.AL owns what is
depicted as Tract 9 (the "K.AL Property"); Stadlers own what is depicted as Tract 10 (the
''Stadler Property"); and at the time the suit was filed, Defendants Jose I. Melendreras and
Jacqueline Z. Diaz-Melendreras ("Melendreras") owned what is depicted as Tract 7 (the
"Melendreras Property"). 1 The above-referenced recorded easements that provide access to the
Baker Property are depicted above as "Alexanna Lane" and "Tract 9 Easement" (respectively,
the "Alexanna Lane Easement" and the "Tract 9 Easement").
The district court correctly ruled that Baker has a perpetual ingress, egress, and utilities
easement to access Tract 8 through the Alexrinna Lane Easement and the Tract 9 Easement.
Following entry of the district court's decision granting summary judgment to Baker, a document
entitled Final Judgment was entered December 19, 2016. Subsequent to entry of the "Final
Judgment," an Amended Final Judgment was entered March 17, 2017. The Amended Final
Judgment was entered to correct perceived deficiencies with the "Final Judgment" namely, to
address the Counterclaims and Cross-Claims of the Defendants. No appeal was taken from the
Amended Final Judgment.

II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case involves an access road commonly referred to as Alexanna Lane which road is
and has historically been used to access Tract 8, the Baker parcel. The legal description of that
road was included as Exhibit B to the Warranty Deed from Timber-Land-Ag, LLC
("Timberland") to Melendreras, Baker's predecessor in interest, Instrument No. 1576391,
1 Melendreras

no longer owns Tract 7 and is not participating as a party upon this appeal.
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records of Kootenai County (the "Warranty Deed"). R., p. 119-126. 2 Prior to 1999, Timberland
owned all parcels at issue in this matter, including but not limited to, Tracts 7, 8, 9, and 10.
On or about March 5, 2014, Baker purchased Tract 8 from Melendreras and took title
pursuant to a Warranty Deed recorded March 5, 2014, in Kootenai County, as Instrument No.
2448258000. R., p. 27. As noted above, Baker's predecessor in interest, Melendreras, purchased
Tract 8, along with Tract 7, and took title pursuant to the Warranty Deed from Timberland,
recorded February 19, 1999. R., p. 128, 'JI 2; R., p. 135-138.
Defendant KAL, LLC, is the owner of Tract 9, a parcel of real property in Kootenai
County pursuant to a Warranty Deed recorded April 4, 2002. R., p. 27. Defendant Stadler is the
owner of Tract 10, a parcel of real property in Kootenai County pursuant to a Warranty Deed
recorded January 9, 2003. R., p. 27.
In response to the Complaint to quiet title filed by Baker, KAL, the Stadlers, and
Melendreras each filed an Answer, as well as affirmative Counterclaims and Cross-claims
against Baker, and against each other. On June 17, 2015, Stadler filed Defendants John and
Vickie Stadler's Answer, Defenses, Counterclaims and Crossclaims in Response to Plaintiffs
Complaint. R., p. 26-31. Therein, the Stadlers asserted a counterclaim/cross claim to quiet title
against Baker and Melendreras as Baker's predecessor in interest. Id. In· addition, the Stadlers
asserted a claim for trespass against Baker, as well as a separate claim for trespass against
Melendreras. Id.

2

Declaration of David E. Schumann.
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On August 3, 2015, Melendreras filed an Answer to Counterclaim; Defenses; CrossClaim wherein Melendreras concedes the existence of a valid easement to access Tract 8 (the
Baker parcel) by and through Tract 10 (the Stadler parcel). R., p. 36-42.
On September 30, 2015, Baker filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, together with a
brief in support, the Declaration of Stephen B. McCrea3, Declaration of David E. Schumann, and
Affidavit of Jose I. Melendreras, requesting the district court rule, as a matter of law, that Baker
enjoyed a perpetual a 60-foot wide easement (Alexanna Lane) for ingress, egress, and utilities to
Tract 8 and that such easement was appurtenant to and legally described on Exhibit B of the
Deed from Timberland to Melendreras, Instrument No. 1576391, records of Kootenai County,
Idaho. 4

In material part, Baker asserted that the Warranty Deed from Timberland to

Melendreras, conveying both Parcel l (Tract 7 - Kootenai County Tax #18116) and Parcel 2
(Tract 8 - Kootenai County Tax #18117) contained express terms and Exhibits (A, B, and C),
which reflected Timberland's intent to convey an easement to Melendreras so they could access
Tract 8 through other parcels retained by Timberland, i.e., Tracts 9 and 10. R., at p. 51-55. In
particular, Exhibit A includes the grant of an easement for ingress and egress to Tract 8 along the
north boundary of Tract 9 (Kootenai County Tax #18158). Id. Exhibit B ("Ingress, Egress and
Utilities Easement") contains a legal description for the centerline of Alexanna Lane and is

A 2nd Declaration of Stephen B. McCrea was filed November 5, 2015, together with a substitute copy of Exhibit 5,
pages 1&2, representing a correct copy of Instrument No. 1529118, records of Kootenai County, Idaho. R., p., 263264, Exhibits at 265-266. A 3111 Declaration of Stephen B. McCrea was filed November 25, 2015, containing
substitute copies of Exhibits 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 representing certified copies of the same. R., p. 267-268, Exhibits at
p. 269-310.
4 R., p. 47-48 (Motion for Summary Judgment); p., 49-61 (Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment); p. 62-118 (Declaration of S1ephen B. McCrea); p. 119-126 (Declaration of David E. Schumann); p. 127141 (Affidavit of Jose I. Melendreras).

3

4

referenced and incorporated as an Exhibit to the Warranty Deed but is not specifically included
as a grant or reservation. Exhibit C contains the legal description for the easement over the
northern portion of Tract 9. Alexanna Lane does not .otherwise touch Tract 8 but for the express
grant of easement along the northerly boundary of Tract 9. Id. Thus, the Warranty Deed is
ambiguous because even though the exact language of the Warranty Deed did not specifically
grant an easement, it is clear that the easement described in Exhibit B (Alexanna Lane) was
included or intended to be specifically included in the Warranty Deed since, without the ability
to access Alexanna Lane, Melendreras and successor owners would not have the ability to
exercise their right to access Tract 8 through the northern 60-feet of Tract 9. Id.
On October 15, 2015, KAL filed its Answer and Counterclaim, asserting that Baker's use
of the easement across Tract 9 was wrongful and constituted a trespass. R., p. 142-145. On
October 30, 2015, KAL filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Baker's Motion for Summary
Judgment, together with an Affidavit of David White. R., p. 223-234, 235-240. Therein, KAL
focused the vast majority of its briefing upon implied easement theories and, apart from passing
reference, did not address the arguments or authority raised with respect to the motion for
summary judgment upon the existence of an express easement. See generally, R., p. 223-234.
On June 13, 2016, Baker filed its Reply in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment, together with an Objection to Motion to Strike the Second Affidavit of Jose I.
Melendreras. 5 R., p. 329-341, 321 -328, and 318-320, respectively. By her Reply, Baker again

Pending a hearing on Baker' s motion for summary judgment, this Jaw firm appeared as additional counsel for
Plaintiff and no substantive action was taken until May 23, 2016, at which time the Second Affidavit of Jose I.
Melendreras was filed in anticipation of a hearing upon Baker's Motion for Summary Judgment. See R., p. 15

5

5

requested entry of judgment as a matter of Jaw upon the theory of an express easement upon the
ground that, while the Warranty Deed from Timberland to Melendreras was ambiguous, there
was no genuine issue of material fact that Timberland intended to grant an easement to access
Tract 8 through Tracts 7, 9, and 10.
Baker's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing on June 20, 2016. During a
subsequent hearing held June 29, 2016, the district court announced its decision upon Baker's
motion for summary judgment, granting Baker's motion upon the theory of an express easement
to access Tract 8. T. June 29, 2016.
In his decision, Judge Haynes determined (1) Timberland was the common owner of
Tracts 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 and that Alexanna Lane crosses Lots 5, 6, 11, 10, 7, and 9; (2)
Timberland used Alexanna Lane to access Tract 8; (3) in 1999, a warranty deed conveying
property was executed from Timberland to Melendreras, conveying ownership of Tracts 7 and 8;
(4) the Warranty Deed conveyed a 60-foot easement running from Tract 9 into Tract 8; and, (5)
Melendreras sold Tract 8 to Baker in 2014, together with a deed and an easement to access Tract
8, the same easement access that is Alexanna Lane, that was the subject of the Warranty Deed
from Timberland to Melendreras. See generally, T. June 29, 2016, pgs. 4-8. The district court
further found that the Warranty Deed and attached Exhibit C was ambiguous and thus required
the court to ascertain the intent of the grantor. Id. In making this determination, the district court
(Docket); R., p. 314•3 I7. KAL moved the court to strike portions of the Melendreras affidavits by Motion dated
June 6, 2016. R. p., 318+320. This Motion was granted in part and denied in part during the district court's
pronunciation of his decision upon the motion for summary judgment. T. June 29, 2016. KAL included the district
court's decision upon its Motion to Strike as a preliminary issue upon appeal but did not include any argument
regarding the same in its opening brief in this matter. See R., p. 369 (Notice of Appeal); p. 374 (Amended Notice of
Appeal).
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concluded that based upon the record before it, there was no contrary evidence and therefore no
genuine issue of material fact as to the intent of the Grantor, Timberland, to grant an easement to
Melendreras to cross Tracts 5,_6, 11, 10, and 9, to access Tract 8. Id. The district ~ourt thus
concluded that Balcer enjoys an express easement by written instrument which easement was
conveyed from Timberland to Melendreras and from Melendreras to Balcer. /d. 6
Following entry of the district court's order upon summary judgment, additional
proceedings resulted in the entry of a document entitled Final Judgment on December 19, 2016. 7
R., p. 358-366. Therein the Court entered Judgment in favor of Plaintiff, decreeing that Plaintiff
possessed a valid perpetual ingress, egress, and utilities easement across the properties owned by
Defendants. Id. The Court further entered Judgment in favor of Balcer and against the Stadlers
and KAL, dismissing the Counterclaims with prejudice. Id. On January 30, 2017, KAL filed an
appeal from the document entitled Final Judgment. An Amended Notice of Appeal was filed by
KAL on February 13, 2017.
On March 8, 2017, a Motion to Amend the Final Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60, I.R.C.P.,
was filed, which Motion was granted, followed by entry of an Amended Final Judgment on
March 17, 2017. See R., p. 20 (Docket entry of March 8, 2017), R. p., 383-391. Pursuant to the
Upon all other theories of relief, namely, implied easement theories, the district court denied summary judgment,
concluding the existence of genuine issues of material fact. In any event, however, adjudication of alternative
theories for relief was unnecessary in light of the district court's conclusion that Baker had an express easement to
access Tract 8. T. June 29, 2016, p. 8, I. 18 - p. 10, I. 12.
7 Baker's First Amended Complaint was filed July 20, 2017. Request for leave to file the First Amended Complaint
was made prior to the hearing upon the motion for summary judgment on June 3, 2016. R., p. 15. Only Stadler filed
an Answer to the First Amended Complaint. R., p. 16. The claims asserted pursuant to the First Amended
Complaint were resolved by way of a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Counts Four and Five of the First Amended
Complaint. See R., p. 17; Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Count Six filed September 14, 2016, Order of
Dismissal of Count Six, filed October 6, 2016. All counterclaims/cross claims were resolved subject to additional
briefing and the Amended Final Judgment, entered March 17, 2017. R., p. 383-391.
6
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Amended Final Judgment, the Court further decreed that Judgment was granted with respect to
the Cross-claims at issue in this matter. The Amended Final Judgment fully adjudicated all
claims at issue in this matter and constitutes the Final Judgment entered in this matter. KAL did
not appeal from the Amended Final Judgment.

III. RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether the present appeal by KAL is procedurally defective and should be dismissed.
2. Whether the district court correctly held that Baker has an express easement for ingress
and egress.
3. Whether Baker is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 12-121.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
An Idaho appellate court reviewing a ruling on summary judgment employs the same
standard as the district court below. Er/and v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 136 Idaho 131, 133, 30 P.3d
286, 288 (2001). Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled a judgment
as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). In order to demonstrate a genuine issue·of material fact, the
party opposing the motion must present more than a conclusory assertion that an issue of fact
exists.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mocaby, 133 Idaho 593,596, 990 P.2d 1204, 1207 (1999). Instead,

the party opposing summary judgment must respond to the motion with specific facts showing
there is a general issue for trial. Id.; see also I.R.C.P. 56(e) ("[A]n adverse party may not rest
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upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial."). A mere scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt as to the facts is
insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87,
730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986). Moreover, the existence of disputed facts will not defeat summary
judgment when the plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to his case, and on which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. E.g., Garzee

v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771,774,828 P.2d 334,337 (Ct. App. 1992).
In addition, as noted by the district court, this case was set for a court trial. "When an
action will be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is not constrained to draw
inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment but rather the trial
judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted
evidentiary facts." Loomis v. Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991) (citing

Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 650 P.2d 657 (1982); Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108
Idaho 469, 700 P.2d 91 (Ct.App.1985)).

In the present action neither party has claimed that any genuine issues of material fact
exist with-respect to the grant of summary judgment upon the theory of an express easement.
Rather, KAL simply argues that the district court erred in its determination that the deeds at issue
were "ambiguous." In addition, KAL argues that the district court erred in interpreting the intent
of the parties when it created a new easement. Each of these arguments is without merit.

9

V.ARGUMENT
A.

KAL did not timely appeal from the Amended Final Judgment entered in this matter.
Pursuant to its Amended Notice of Appeal, filed February 13, 2017, KAL appeals from the

Final Judgment filed by the Clerk on December 19, 2016, entered in this action on or about
December 14, 2016, the Honorable Lansing Haynes presiding. Therein, KAL asserts that the Final
Judgment entered December 14, 2016 is an appealable order pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l), Idaho
·Appellate Rules.

The document entitled "Final Judgment" entered by the district court on

December 14, 2016, did not comply with Rule 54(a), I.R.C.P. Under that rule, ''A judgment is final
if either it is a partial judgment that has been certified as final pursuant to subsection (b)(l) of this
rule or judgment has been entered on all claims for relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or
against all parties in the action." I.R.C.P. 54(a) (emphasis added). The document entitled Final
Judgment entered December 14, 2016 was not entered upon all claims for relief asserted by or
against all parties in this action. R., p. 358-359; c.f., R., p. 383-384. An Amended Final Judgment
was, however, entered on March 17, 2017, adjudicating all claims between all parties to this action,
from which no appeal was taken by KAL. Rule 14, I.A.R., provides that "any appeal as a matter of
right from the district court may be made only by physically filing a notice of appeal with the clerk
of the district court within 42 days from the date evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the
court on any judgment or order of the district court appealable as a matter of right in any civil or
criminal action." I.A.R. 14 (emphasis added).

KAL did not appeal from the Amended Final

Judgment entered March 17, 2017. As this Court has previously declared:

lO

"[S]ubject matter jurisdiction is an issue that this Court may
raise sua sponte at any time." Johnson v. Blaine County, 146 Idaho
916, 924, 204 P.3d 1127, 1135 (2009). This Court will, sua sponte,
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction an appeal that is taken from a nonappealable order. Highlands pev. Corp. v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho
958, 960, 188 P.3d 900, 902 (2008). "Although the document was
entitled 'Judgment,' that is not controlling. 'Whether an instrument
is an appealable order or judgment must be determined by its
content and substance, and not by its title."' Harrison v. Certain
Undenvriters at Lloyd's, London, 149 Idaho 201, 205, 233 P.3d
132, 136 (2010) (quoting Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137
Idaho 850,867, 55 P.3d 304,321 (2002)).
Holland v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. (In re Estate of Holland), 153 Idaho 94, 99, 279 P.3d 80,
85-86 (2012).

KAL appealed from a non-appealable order and failed to remedy this defect

following entry of an Amended Final Judgment. In addition, or in lieu of the substantive arguments
raised below, the appeal should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

B. The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment Because There Was an
Ambiguity in the Deed and Timberland Intended to Grant Melendreras an
Express Easement in Alexanna Lane.
1.

The District Court Properly Held that the Warranty Deed was Ambiguous.

The Appellant asserts that the District Court erred in holding that the Warranty Deed
from Timberland to Melendreras is ambiguous. In the proceedings before the district court, the
sole argument advanced by KAL with respect to Baker's motion for summary judgment upon the
theory of an express easement was included in the section of KAL's Memorandum in Opposition
to Baker's Motion for Summary Judgment in the section entitled "Statutory Easements Pass with
Property." R, p. 228. Therein, KAL simply argues that "reserved" and "grant" "are neither
ambiguous nor synonymous." R., p. 228. No additional authority or argument are advanced by

11

KAL with respect to the existence of an express easement. During oral argument, KAL argued
only that the Warranty Deed from Timberland to Melendreras reserved access through Tract 7
and that the lack of a reservation of access through Tracts 9 and 10 was intentional. T. June 20,
2016, p. 54, 11. 4-25. With the exception of jurisdictional issues, "[a]n argument not raised below
and not supported in the briefs is waived on appeal." Minor Miracle Prods., LLC v. Starkey, 152
Idaho 333, 336, 271 P.3d 1189, 1192 (2012) (citations omitted). In addition to a failure to
provide clear context or support for Appellant's position in the proceedings before the district
court, the argument presently advanced upon appeal is difficult to decipher and is itself
ambiguous.

In interpreting and construing deeds of conveyance, the primary goal is to seek and give
effect to the real intention of the parties. Benninger v. Derifie/d, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d
1235, 1238 (2006) (citing Neider v. Shaw, 65 P.3d 525 (2003); C&G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho
763, 25 P.3d 76 (2001)). "In the absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its
plain, ordinary and proper sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of the
instrument" C&G Inc., 135 Idaho at 765, 25 P.3d at 78 (citing Juker v. American Livestock Ins.

Co., 102 Idaho 644, 645, 637 P.2d 792, 793 (1981)).

Conversely, when a Court finds a

document to be ambiguous, the Court may consider parol evidence to discover the drafter's
intent. Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 404-05, 195 P.3d 1212, 1217-18 (2008).
The district court in this case properly applied Idaho law decreeing that "[u]ncertainties
should be treated as ambiguities; such ambiguities are subject to be cleared up by resort to the
intention of the parties as gathered from the deed, from the circumstances attending and leading
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up to its execution. from the subject matter. and from the situation of the parties at the time. "

Benninger v. Derifield. 142 Idaho at 489. 129 P.3d at 1238 (citing City of Kellogg v. Mission
Mountain Interests. 13? Idaho 239, 16 P.3d 915 (2000)). The district court c~rrectly perceived
that the use of "reserved" was not dispositive but instead created an uncertainty. given the other
circumstances surrounding the conveyance of easements appurtenant to Tract 8.
An easement may be created by way of exception or by
reservation .... No particular forms or words of art are necessary;
it is necessary only that the parties make clear their intention to
establish a servitude. Regardless of the terms used. courts
generally will attempt to ascertain the intention of the parties by
referring not only to the language of the deed, but also to the
circumstances attending the transaction and the condition of the
property.

Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006) (citing Seccombe v.
Weeks, 115 Idaho 433, 436, 767 P.2d 276, 279 (Ct. App. 1989), disapproved of on other grounds,
Rodriguez v. Oakley Valley Stone, Inc., 120 Idaho 370,378,816 P.2d 326,334 (1991)).
The Timberland Warranty Deed expressly conveys:
1.

a grant to Melendreras in real property described on "EXHIBIT A" together with

their appurtenances.
2.

a grant that is subject to existing easements and right of ways.

R., p. 77.

However, the Warranty Deed is not a model of clarity. In reviewing the four comers of
the Warranty Deed, including Exhibit A, together with other Exhibits referenced in Exhibit A,
Exhibits B (the Alexanna Lane legal description) and Exhibit C (the easement over the northly
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portion of Tract 9), the district court correctly perceived that the Warranty Deed was ambiguous.
For example, pursuant to Exhibit A, Timberland seems to reserve a portion of Alexanna Lane as
it relates to Parcel 1 (Tract 7), but then describes the reservation of the entire Lane under Exhibit
B, not just the portion within Tract 7:
RERVERING THEREFROM, that portion of the above described
parcel which is described in an Ingress, Egress and Utilities
Easement as more fully described on in Exhibit "B" attached
hereto and incorporated herein in.
R.,p. 78.

The language of the deed is ambiguous because it "reserves" an easement across its own
property, i.e., the entire Alexanna Lane, including the portions that run through Tract 7. In other
words, Exhibit B does not just describe the portion of the reservation in only Tract 7, but it
describes a reservation covering the entire portion of Alexanna Lane, including those lands
owned and retained by Timberland post-closing of the Melendreras deal. As the district court
correctly held, Timberland could not possibly reserve an easement for itself on property it owns.
T. June 29, 2016, p.7 11. 11-25. Further, the inclusion of a reservation is not necessary as the
Warranty Deed specifically provides that the grant is "subject to all existing... easements, right
of way ... " which clearly would have included Alexanna Lane in any event. R., p. 77. As such,
the district court properly found the word "reserving" to be an ambiguous phrase in the context
of the entire-deed. T. June 29, 2016 p. 1311. 19-25.
Additionally, the Warranty Deed is unclear on its face because Timberland makes a
vague and failed attempt to grant Melendreras an express easement to gain access to Parcel 2
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(Tract 8) through Timberland's Tract 9. Expanding, pursuant to the Warranty Deed, Timberland
grants Melendreras an access easement to traverse over the north 60 feet of Tract 9 providing
Melendreras and successor owners access to Parcel 2 (Tract 8). R., p. 78. However, Timberland
failed to grant specific access in Alexanna Lane to the owners of Parcel 2 (Tract 8) in order to
allow them to connect to the 60-foot easement in order to gain access to Parcel 2 (Tract 8). The
express right of access granted to Melendreras to traverse over the north 60 feet of Tract 9 to
access Parcel 2 (Tract 8) in the Warranty Deed is meaningless if it does not also include an
express right to use Alexanna Lane.

In short, the Warranty Deed is ambiguous because

Timberland grants Melendreras a right to access Parcel 2 (Tract 8) without granting the legal
ability to exercise that right.
The district court thus correctly observed that the Warranty Deed's grant of access over a
portion of Tract 9, coupled with Timberland's reference of Alexanna Lane in improperly
reserving (not granting) access, creates an ambiguity as to how and when to apply the express
terms contained in the document and reconcile inconsistent terms. As the district court fittingly
noted, an absurd result occurs when applying the literal definition of "reserving" in light of
Timberland's grant of access over Lot 9 under the Warranty Deed. T. June 29, 2016 p. 1311. 1924. Therefore, the district court's ruling that the inconsistent language created an ambiguity in
the Warranty Deed was proper.
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2.
The District Court Properly Held that Timberland Intended to Grant
the Melendreras an Access Easement to Lot 8.
When a Court finds a document to be ambiguous, the Court may consider parol evidence to
discover the drafter's intent. 'Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 404-05, 195 P.3d 1212, 1217-18
(2008). Parol evidence may be considered to aid a trial court in determining the intent of the drafter
of a document if an ambiguity exists. Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483,484, 777 P.2d 255, 256 (1989).
Paro] evidence may also be considered in a situation where a latent ambiguity might not appear
upon the face of the contract, but lies hidden in the subject to which it has reference. Williams v.
Idaho Potato Starch Co., 73 Idaho 13, 20,245 P.2d 1045, 1049 (1952).

After finding the Warranty Deed to be ambiguous, the district court properly held, that
based on the record, and in light of the absence of contrary evidence, it was Timberland's intention
to grant Melendreras an express easement to cross Tracts 5, 6, 11, 10 and 9 so they could legally
access Tract 8 and to reserve to itself an easement to cross Tracts 7 and 8. T. June 29, 2016 p. 811.
1-9. The district court's finding was proper because the record firmly establishes Timberland's
intent to grant an express easement.

Such evidence includes the following undisputed facts

contained in the affidavits of Mr. Melendreras which give meaning to the granting language:
1. At the time of the Melendreras Purchase, the Easements were being used,
obviously and permanently, by Timberland to access the Baker Property. R., p.
128.
2. At the time of the. Melendreras Purchase, the Easements were reasonably
necessary for the practical use and enjoyment of the Baker Property. R., p. 128.
3. Prior to purchasing the parcels in February 1999, Melendreras, in the presence of
the seller, Vernon Jerry Mortenson, a principal of Timberland, physically
examined both parcels using Alexanna lane. R., p. 128, 'II 2.
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4. As part of obtaining the Joan to purchase the Baker Property, the Melendrerases
were required to secure access to the same by a grant of the Easements from
Timberland. R., p. 315, 'Jl 4. 8

.

.

5. Prior to the close of the Melendreras Purchase, Mr. Melendreras witnessed a
surveyor stake out the Easements and place survey pins along the Easements'
boundaries. R., p. 315, <]{ 5.
6. The description of the Easements was included in the Warranty Deed from
Timberland to the Melendrerases. See e.g., R., p. 119·126.
7. The pins staked by the surveyor in 1999 marking the Easements are still in place
today and conform to the location of the Easements. R., p. 315.
These facts were uncontroverted. As the district court duly noted, KAL purchased Tract 9
in 2002 and the Stadlers purchased Tract 10 in 2006. T. June 29, 2016, at p. 5, 11. 13·15, p. 8, 11. 1317. The district court's conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the
intent of the grantor, Timberland, is not challenged by any citation to contrary evidence in the
record before this Court.
The fact that Timberland granted Melendreras an easement to access Parcel 2 (Tract 8) over
and across the top portion of Tract 9 in the Warranty Deed is additional evidence that Timberland
clearly intended that Melendreras and their successor owners would have unfettered and complete
access to the northern portion of Tract 9 through Alexanna Lane to access Tract 8.
-

-

The district court's grant of summary judgment should be upheld because the district court
was correct in holding that the Warranty Deed was ambiguous and the record conclusively

The district court did grant KAL's Motion to Strike Mr. Melendreras' testimony as to statements made by Mr.
Mortensen. T . June 29, 2016, p. The district court's decision, does not however, materially impact the balance of
Mr. Melendreras' statements relied upon herein or the lack of evidence of a contrary intent by
Mortensen/fimberland.

8

17

establishes, and is devoid of evidence to the contrary, that Timberland intended to grant
Melendreras and successor interest holders of Tract 8 an express easement to cross Tracts 5, 6, I l,
10 and 9 in order to access Tract 8.
C. Baker is Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal Pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 12-121 and Rules 40 and 41, I.A.R..

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121, the court "may award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party or parties when the [court] finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." "Such circumstances exist when an appellant has
only asked the appellate court to second-guess the trial court by reweighing the evidence or has
failed to show that the trial court incorrectly applied well-established law." Fuquay v. low, No.
44155, 2017 Ida. LEXIS 197, at *14-16 (June 29, 2017) (citing City of Boise v. Ada Cnty., 147
Idaho 794,812,215 P.3d 514,532 (2009)). "Ordinarily, attorney fees will not be awarded where the
losing party brought the appeal in good faith and where a genuine issue of law was presented." (Id.
(quoting Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 718, 170 P.3d 375,383 (2007)).
KAL failed to appeal from the Amended Final Judgment which judgment was the only
document to dispose of all of the parties' claims. I.R.C.P. 54. The failure to appeal from a final
judgment renders all further argument by KAL frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. In
addition, turning to the substance of KAL' s argument, KAL has failed to raise any new or
compelling argument to call into question the validity of the district court's initial order granting
summary judgment to Balcer. "[A]ttorney fees on appeal have been awarded under Section 12-121
when appellants failed to add any new analysis or authority to the issues raised below that were
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resolved by a district court's well-reasoned authority." Fuquay, 2017 Ida. LEXIS 197, at *15 (June
29, 2017) (quoting Frantz v. Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley UP. 161 Idaho 60, 66. 383 P.3d
1230, 1236 (2016) (internal quotation omitted)).
KAL's opening brief on appeal re-argues and expands KAL's assertion in its Memorandum
in Opposition to Baker's Motion for Summary Judgment that "reserved" and "grant" "are neither
ambiguous nor synonymous." R .• p. 228. To the extent not previously waived by a lack of cogent
argument or authority, the pursuit of this appeal remains without factual or legal support. KAL
provides no cogent authority or analysis to support its current claim that the district court erred in its
determination of an ambiguity or in its application of the record to ascertain the intent of the parties.
Thus, Baker is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and Rule 41,
I.AR.. Baker is also entitled to an award of costs on appeal pursuant to Rule 40, I.AR.

VI. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons. Baker respectfully requests that the Court uphold the decision of
the district court granting summary judgment in Baker's favor. Baker further requests that the
Court grant Baker an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12121 and Rules 40 and 41, I.A.R.
DATED this l 61h day of August, 2017

Jones+ Gledhill+ Fuhrman+ Gourley, P.A.

By: ~ L ! L
E
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